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SUMMARY
The United States recent deal with a United Arab Emirites Company to operate seven
U.S. Ports highlights a growing tension in U.S. and Arabic commercial relations. One
tension that has remained unnoticed is the role that U.S Courts play in interpreting
Islamic texts when the commercial or legal outcome depends on an understanding of the
religious culture. This article describes seven cases that demonstrate various approaches
to this problem.

This article utilizes an approach by James Boyd White, and suggests

that translation or its kin transliteration can help judges in deciding Islamic legal
principles.
ARTICLE
Robert Cover in his now famous (and controversial) article Nomos and Narrative
began by informing us that we “inhabit a nomos – a normative universe.”1 By normative
universe, Cover means to tell us that our world is constantly juxtaposed between
principles of right and wrong – rights and wrongs that are intrinsically and inseparably
connected to the narrative that forms them.2 That narrative and norms compliment each
other is nothing new; that narrative and norms create separate worlds of occupation that
collide with one another in concrete and specific ways is another problem all together.
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Id. at 5.

Our lot in this piece is to illustrate what happens when two nomos engage one another in
the specific context of the legal system.
As Perry Crane said in his own grappling of Cover’s understanding of a nomos –
the encounter of one nomos with another is not just a clash of wills, or a test of
commitments, but an effort at cognition.3 Nowhere is law more normative than when it is
based on religious expression. (That does not mean that other law is not normative if
based on something other than religion; only that religion tends to create a supernormative law – laws that carry eternal consequences so to speak). Thus, when two
normative systems that are built around different suppositions meet in judicial process,
courts must utilize some tool of cognition and response to adequately address the
concerns each norm presents. As the discourse of law is considered across cultural and
ethnic boundaries, the analogy of translation becomes a useful tool fornavigating that
cognition.
James Boyd White, in his work Justice as Translation, suggests that translation is
ultimately an art of recognition and response, both to another person and another
language; that translation transports the translator away from his own language and to a
place between languages (and people) where differences are more easily comprehended;
and that translation is inherently a self-limiting process.4 This essay builds on White’s
analogy, and uses his definitions to consider how United States Courts ruminate about
Islamic law when confronted with tensions between Islamic practice and modern
commercial practice.
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Before proceeding to analyze the trends, some general observations are worth
noting. First, there is no Islamic law per se that U.S. Courts recognize; rather the laws
are tied to specific nation states, such as the law of Saudi Arabia, Iran or Afghanistan.5
Nevertheless, courts recognize the conceptual links between countries that share in
common a system of Shari’a and proceed as operating under a generic “Islamic Law.”6
Thus, the comparison to the “common law” forms an easy conceptual bridge for judges
attempting to understand how principles of Islamic law relate to the laws of nations.7
Second, the courts treat the application of foreign law as a hybrid question of law
and fact; that is, under varying rules of civil procedure, foreign law is a question of law to
be determined by the court.8 However, the “fact” of a foreign law is still up to debate.
Therefore, courts will often hold evidentiary hearings, eliciting expert testimony from
both sides, and even engaging its own expert to get to the “fact” of the law.9 This
analysis itself can be deceptive. Suggesting that the law is a fact, instead of a norm or a
principle suggests that the law itself can be apprehended apart from the culture that the
law (or laws) derives from.10
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See e.g., Bridas Corp. v. Unocal Corp., 16 S.W.3d 893, 897 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)
(Afghani law); CPS Int’l v. Dresser Industries Inc., 911 S.W.2d 18, 21 (Tex. Ct. App.
1995) (Saudi Arabian law);Saudi Basic Oil Industries Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu
Petrochemical, 866 A.2d 1, 11 (Del. 2005) (Saudi Arabian law); Blackstone v. Aramco
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Third, there is a certain negotiation that occurs in the American legal system that
needs to be reckoned with. The American legal system is a purely adversarial system of
law; that is, as litigants prepare their legal arguments, they do so with the aim not of
achieving justice but of winning, though I doubt few litigants consider their cases to be
unjust.11 The result is that the expert in opining about the law and attempting to establish
“the fact of the law” is doing so to further his client’s economic interests. That experts
are paid to give their testimony only complicates this matter. For example, Frank Vogel
served as an expert in four of the seven cases reviewed for this article. In two of those
four cases, Vogel’s testimony appears to be a conservative reading of Islamic law; by
conservative, I mean more literally formalistic. For example, he suggests in Bridas Corp.
v. Unocal Corp. that Islamic Law would not allow for the tort of Interference with a
Contract because of the firm maxim that whoever does an act bears ultimate
responsibility.12 Yet, in NGCC v. Lucent Technologies, Vogel is willing to stray from
firm maxims towards interpretive results. Though agreeing that traditionally, the
principle of gharar would disallow future type damages, he opines that “higher
valuations of damages are possible as long as the future event is not an explicit condition
of the contract, and that uncertainty that is subsumed within a larger entity, such as a
corporation, would be upheld , and that it is only when gharar inheres within a separate
entity is it forbidden.”13 While there may be no direct contradiction in Vogel’s thought
process, there appears to be a conflict between a rigid application of traditional Islamic
law concepts and interpretive ones. The deciding factor is whose behalf the expert is
11
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testifying. Judges, therefore, seeking to find the “fact” of the law, must be leery in
accepting the position of experts who have an interest in their testimony.
Finally, the medium in which we receive the translation -- (for the reader this
article, and for I the writer, case reporters and Westlaw print outs) inhibits our ability to
assess the court’s function. One way of measuring the reaction and the response to
foreign words, phrases and language is the use of body language and subtle suggestions.14
Of course, we (you the reader and I the commentator) sit well away from the Court
proceedings that rendered these decisions. We can’t see furrowed brows, judges and
juries leaning forward, or court reporters with confused looks attempting to spell words
they had never heard before. Sometimes, we sit even further back as the description I
reviewed is another court’s (the appellate court’s) perception of what the trial court or
magistrate did in a particular case. These limitations are not debilitating. Rather,
acknowledging the limitations of our perceptions in these cases actually frees us to
acknowledge that this assessment towards translation is, at the very least, incomplete.
Part one of this article sets the stage by describing in detail seven cases as
reported by the courts, with limited commentary from outside sources. Part two
categorizes the opinions as approaching the issues formalistically, interpretively, or by
using something akin to a model of translation. Part three continues the discussion from
part two, drawing conclusions about the various approaches and qualities of each. Part
four suggests that the role that judges perceive themselves as engaging is quite predictive
in how the court will assess Islamic concepts.
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These cases are efforts by the judiciary to come to terms with law that is both
culturally and normatively variant from its ordinary course and consideration. This
article considers, along the lines of White’s discussion, how the court translates Islamic
law. In other words, how the court reacts to and responds to Islamic law, in the face of
Western commercial conceptions and legal assumptions. Also, it considers how the Court
comprehends the differences inherent in the two legal systems and navigates those
differences towards judicial resolution. And how the court embraces a self-limiting
process.
PART ONE
THE CASES
1.

Bridas Corp. v. Unocal Corp., 16 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
In April 2000, the Texas State Court of Appeals for the fourteenth district decided

Bridas Corp. v. Unocal Corp15 -- a contentious matter involving two oil companies and
their rights to build a natural gas pipeline through Afghanistan. In 1991, the former
Soviet Union disbanded leaving several independent nations; one of those nations was
Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan is located on the Caspian Sean, bordering Iran to its south,
Afghanistan to its east and Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to its north. Importantly,
Turkmenistan is one of the ten most promising countries for extracting hydrocarbons
from the earth;16 hydrocarbons are necessary elements for the production of petroleum
and natural gas resources.

15
16

16 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
U.S. Geological Survey 2004 at ___.

In 1991, Turkmenistan began soliciting offers to develop its natural resources.17
Shortly thereafter, Bridas Corp. (“Bridas”) entered into an agreement with the
Turkmenistan Government to develop the nation’s hydrocarbons in certain areas.18
Bridas is a South American Oil Company that had little to no experience in Asian
governmental practices. Their first foray into Asia came in Western Siberia. But as
Carlos Bulgheroni told Ahmed Rashid, “there were too many problems [in Siberia] with
pipelines and taxes, so we arrived in Turkmenistan when it opened up.”19 Perhaps a
naivety towards Asian relations was to Bulgheroni’s and Bridas’s credit; though western
oil companies scoffed at the Bridas/ Turkmenistan contract, because of the politics,
geography, or potential loss, Bridas was convinced that it could generate and transport
natural resources in the same ways it had done so in South America.20 Succinctly, lack of
experience in governmental affairs did not mean the company could not be successful at
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Bridas Corp. 16 S.W.3d at 895.
Bridas Corp was contracted to explore the Keimir block in the western part of the
country and the Yashlar Block in the eastern portion of Turkmenistan. Bridas Corp., 16
S.W.3d at 895. See also AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL, AND
FUNDAMENTALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA 158 (2000)
19
RASHID, supra note 4, at 158. Rashid sees Bridas Corp. and Bulgheroni’s experience
in Turkmenistan as an extension of early twentieth century conflation of oil and foreign
policy. His description of Bulgheroni captures the imagination much in the same way
that descriptions of John D. Rockefeller of the late nineteenth century impugn images of
the pious dictator -- “charming, erudite, a philosopher captain of industry, he could talk
for hours about the collapse of Russia, the future of the oil industry, or Islamic
fundamentalism.” Id.
20
Id. Bhulghani says that “other oil companies shied away from Turkmenistan because
they thought it a gas place and had no idea where to market it. Our experience in
discovering and transporting it through cross-border pipelines to multiple markets in
Latin America convinced me that the same could be done in Turkmenistan.” Id.
Apparently no other Western oil companies bothered with presenting proposals to the
Turkmenistan government. Id. The fact that Bridas was the only company to submit
offers resulted in Bridas receiving extremely favorable terms for the drilling, namely a
75-25 split in profits in Bridas’s favor in the region of Keimir and a 50-50 split in the
region of Yashlar.
18

excavation as exploratory drilling by Bridas discovered a natural gas reserve holding an
estimated twenty-seven trillion cubic feet of gas.21 Though Turkmenistan had no need
for such production, Pakistan did and executed an agreement with Turkmenistan to
purchase the gas for a period of thirty years.
Because Pakistan did not border Turkmenistan, international cooperation was
imperative to the Pakistani Turkmen deal.22

The most direct route was through

Afghanistan, whose stability was becoming more and more tenuous with the emergence
of the Taliban as a controlling government of the region. Bulgheroni opened negotiations
with the Afghan warlords that ruled the Afghan territories, and proposed the construction
of an 875-mile pipeline from Yashlar, Turkmenistan to Sui in the southern province of
Pakistan.23 The Afghan tribal leaders embraced the Bridas proposal and Bridas prepared
to move forward.24 Bridas contacted Unocal Corp. in 1995 and extended an invitation for
Unocal to participate with Bridas in the development of the Turkmenistan hydrocarbon
project. Importantly, no agreements were consummated between Unocal and Bridas.25
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See Bridas Corp., 16 S.W.3d at 895. Importantly, Bridas Corp. invested more than
U.S.$400 Million in exploring its leases, as Rashid says “a staggering sum in those early
days when not even oil majors were involved in Central Asia. Bridas was successful in
its overall operations extracting upwards of 16,800 Barrels of Oil per day. But the big
discovery was in the Yashlar region and the massive repository of natural gas. RASHID,
supra note 4, at 158.
22
See RASHID supra note 4, at 895. Interestingly, Bulgheroni saw a pipeline of peace
through Afghanistan. With the Afghani turbulence coming to a head with the seizure of
Khandahar by the Taliban, Bulgheroni saw his pipeline as “a peace-making business.”
Id.
23
Id. at 159.
24
Id. One of the appealing aspects of the Bridas proposal was the open-access nature of
the pipeline. Afghanistan at one time supplied Uzbekistan with Natural Gas reserves, but
had shut them down in the wake of national chaos. Id.
25
Bridas Corp., 16 S.W.3d at 896.

What followed in the summer of 1995 were independent efforts by Bridas and
Unocal to secure the pipeline construction contract from Turkmenistan.26 Turkmenistan
rejected several proposals by Bridas before accepting an offer from Unocal to build the
pipeline in the Turkmenistan territory.27 Bridas then turned its attention to Afghanistan
and courting certain Afghan officials to an exclusive agreement to build the Afghanistan
pipeline.28 In November 1996, Bridas disclosed that it had signed an agreement with the
Taliban, the political party controlling Afghanistan, to construct the pipeline across
Afghanistan; despite being untrue (Bridas actually only contracted with one person who
claimed to deliver the Taliban)29 Unocal was nevertheless panicked by the news and
attempted to use Pakistani officials to sway the Taliban to their side.30 Bridas had paid
$1 Million to Barhanuddin Rabboni, who controlled less than half of the Afghanistan
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Id. Rashid suggests that Unocal’s involvement and eventual success in obtaining the
contracts related to two factors. First, Bridas was subject of rumors of ill-gotten gain by
the advisors to Turkmenistan President Saparmurad Niyazov. Second, Turkmenistan
officials, Niyazov in particular saw the financial possibilities of securing an American oil
major to the project. Particularly, Niyazov believed that Unocal’s involvement might
lure the attention of the Clinton Administration to invest development funds in
Turkmenistan. Rashid, supra note 4, at 160.
27
Bridas Corp, 16 S.W.3d at 896. The agreement between Unocal and Turkmenistan
provided that Unocal would construct the pipeline, purchase natural gas from
Turkmenistan at the Afghanistan border, and that Turkmenistan reserved the right to
select the natural resources dedicated to the project. Id.
Apparently the Unocal contract shocked the Bridas executives that had been
working to secure the pipeline deal. “We were shocked and when we spoke to Niyazov,
he just turned around and said, ‘why don’t you build a second pipeline.’” See Rashid,
supra note 4, at 160.
28
For an enlightening discussion relating to the benefits Bridas offered the Taliban, see
Rashid, supra note 4 at 166-169.
29
Id. at 169.
30
What is clear is that the Taliban was able to leverage Bridas and Unocal against one
another. Rashid indicates that the Taliban secretly favored Bridas because of their laissez
faire stance towards the humanitarian issues that were becoming a public issue for the
Taliban. However, the Taliban also coveted U.S. recognition -- recognition that would
bring money for roads, electricity, and other development. Id.

territory, and was losing more territory daily.31 Subsequently, Rabboni was forced from
the capital city of Kabul and into the Northeastern corner of the country. The ending of
the story was that neither Bridas nor Unocal completed the project. In 1999, Unocal
withdrew from the project after several unsuccessful attempts to court Afghan officials.
Bridas, whose assets in Turkmenistan were frozen by the Turkmen government, sought
arbitration against Turkmenistan to enforce its earlier agreements.

And ultimately,

Bridas Corp. brought a $15 Billion lawsuit against Unocal in the Texas State Court for
tortuous interference with a contractual relationship.
The Texas State Court conducted a two part analysis: first it decided what laws
applied to the matter at hand; and second, whether those laws recognized the tort claim
for interference with a contractual relationship.
Regarding the Choice of Law question, the Court used the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws to determine that either Turkmen or Afghan law would apply to this
dispute, and not Texas law as urged by Bridas.32 The Court applied the “most significant
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Bridas Corp., 16 S.W.3d at 896.
Id. at 897. The Restatement (Second) identifies seven factors to be considered when a
state has no legislative directive towards applying foreign law: (1) the needs of the
interstate and international systems; (2) the relevant policies of the forum; (3) the relevant
policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue; (4) the protection of justified expectations; (5) the
basic policies underlying the particular field of law; (6) certainty, predictability and
uniformity of results; and (7) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied. See Restatement 2d Conflict of Laws § 6. Moreover, section 145 of the
restatement identifies several issues to be considered when applying section 6 to a tort
matter: (1) the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles state in
section 6; and (2) contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of Section 6
to determine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place where the injury
occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation ad place of business of the parties; and (d)
32

relationship” test to analyze the contacts to the various forums.

The Court first

determined that the situs of injury occurred in Turkmenistan and in Afghanistan rather
than in Texas.33 Next the Court determined that the conduct causing the injury to Bridas
occurred in Turkmenistan or Afghanistan.34 The third factor relating to the parties
respective places of incorporation and principle places of business also weighed in
Unocal’s favor, as neither company was incorporated in Texas and neither maintained
more than a satellite office in Houston.35 Fourth, the Court found that there was no
business relationship previously existing between Unocal and Bridas Corp. to salvage an
application of Texas law.36 Finally, the court rejected Bridas’s claims that Texas Public
Policy warrants application of Texas law to this matter. Claiming that the state of Texas

the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. These contacts
are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular
issue. Id. § 145. The Court finally applied section 156 to the problem in understanding
how section 145 and section 6 comport.
Importantly, the Bridas Court followed precedent established by the Texas
Supreme Court and another appellant court with similar facts. See Gutierrez v. Collins,
583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979) & CPS Int’l Inc. v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 911 S.W.2d 18 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1995). For an expanded discussion of CPS, see infra notes ___, and text
accompanying.
33
Bridas Corp, 16 S.W.3d at 897-98.
34
In making this determination, the Court relied on CPS Int’l v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 911
S.W.2d 18 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995). In CPS Int’l, the plaintiffs alleged tortious interference
with a contract arising in Saudi Arabia. The Court held that the fact that tortious conduct
may have been directed from the state of Texas does not alter the reality that the conduct
was directed to and carried out in Saudi Arabia, and it was the carrying out of the conduct
that was the source of its harmful nature.”
Bridas Corp. argued unsuccessfully that the holding in CPS Int’lresulted in an
unjust result. The Court additionally cited facts that weighed heavily towards the
application of foreign law, including: the acknowledgement by Bridas Chief Operating
Officer that the interference occurred in Turkmenistan; and the fact that the gas contracts
and protocols were not negotiated in Texas but in Turkmenistan. See Bridas Corp, 16
S.W.3d at 898.
35
Id. at 898-99. Bridas Corp. is incorporated in the British Virgin Islands with a
principle place of business in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Unocal is a Delaware
Corporation headquartered in California. Id.
36
Id.

has an interest in regulating companies doing business in its borders, together with the
difficulty in predicting and ascertaining both Turkmen and Afghan law, Bridas urged the
rejection of foreign law in favor of Texas state law. The Court rejected both arguments
and spent the rest of the opinion explaining the contours of both Turkmen and Afghan
law.37 This summary will exclude the discussion relating to Turkmen law as outside the
scope of the greater article.
In summarizing Afghani law, at least five expert witnesses appeared (four
testifying on Unocal’s behalf) to testify to the sum and substance of the territory’s law, its
applicability, and understandability.38

Bridas’s expert, Dr. Mark Hoyle,39 an

administrative law judge from London, testified that Afghani law was difficult to
apprehend because of the few resources on the matter.40 Accordingly, Hoyle testified
that in his opinion and “based on the Hanafi as it has been codified in the Afghan Civil
Code and Commercial Code, a cause of action exists for interference with a contractual
relationship.”41 In coming to his conclusion, Hoyle relied on articles from the Afghan
Civil Code, and interpretations of Islamic law from Egypt, Jordan, and the United Arab
Emirates. 42

37

Id.
Rashid reports that at least nine experts testified. However, it appears four of those
experts related Turkmen law rather than Afghani law. Rashid, supra note 4, at 179.
39
Hoyle has published one book relating to Islamic Commerce: MARK HOYLE, MIXED
COURTS OF EGYPT (1991); he has published other books that address Islamic Legal
concerns in the context of International law: THE MAREVA INJUNCTION AND RELATED
ORDERS (3d ed. 1997) and THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2d Ed. 1985). He is also
co-founder and editor of the Arab Law Quarterly.
40
It is important to note that Hoyle’s testimony comports with Bridas Corp’s overall legal
strategy -- that the Conflict of Law analysis should sway towards an application of Texas
law because Afghani law was indeterminable. See Bridas Corp., 16 S.W.3d at 899.
41
See id. at 904-05.
42
Bridas Corp, 16 S.W.3d at 904.
38

On the other side, Unocal (and its co-defendant Delta -- a Saudi Arabian subsidy
of Unocal) presented four experts that convinced the court that not only was Afghani law
ascertainable, but that it did not recognize a tort for interference with contractual
relations. Unocal’s first expert, Professor Ian Edge,43 testified that Afghanistan follows a
purely non-secular form of Islamic law deriving from the Hanafi school of thought. Edge
testified that the sources of decision come from religious scholars not judges who
interpret the two sources of Islamic law -- the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the Mejelle.44 He
further testified that under these sources of law, Afghanistan courts would not recognize a
tort for interference with contractual relations.45 In arriving at this conclusion, Edge
noted that the Shari’a provides for recovery only where a physical injury has occurred to
person or property. Edge’s conclusion that interference with a contractual relationship is
not tangible or direct and is therefore incompensable was based on articles 89 and 1510
of the Mejelle.46 Additionally because a harm cannot result from a lawful act, Bridas
could have no cause of action in Afghanistan. Unocal’s second and third witnesses,
Muhammed Rostayee and Abdul Salam Azimi agreed with Edge’s conclusion that the
Afghan civil code affords no remedy for Bridas’s action.47
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Id. at 903. Edge is a law professor at the University of London specializing in Islamic
and Middle Eastern Law.
44
Id. at 903.
45
Id.
46
Id. The Court of Appeals also cited in a footnote Civil Code article 787: “Action shall
relate to the actor, not the commander, except when the actor is intimidated. In actions,
only complete aversion shall be recognized as credible force majeure. The Court further
noted that article 551 defined aversion as the “intimidation of a person, unreasonably for
executing an action without consent whether it may be material or spiritual.” Id at 903
n.6.
47
The second witness presented by Unocal was Muhammed Roystayee, a lawyer licensed
to practice law in Adghanistan. He testified that “there is no mention of the [causes of
action pled by Bridas] in the civil code and neither in the Shari’a law. Id. at 904.

The fourth expert presented by Unocal was Dr. Frank Vogel.48

Vogel first

testified that Bridas’s expert (Hoyle) used an inexact translation of the Afghan Civil Code
was inexact. He further stated the following in an effort to contextualize Islamic nonrecognition of non-direct torts:
One thinks, when one encounters anything like this,
these torts specifically, if you encounter something in the
translation that corresponds with these torts, you come up
with absolutely nothing, not in any secondary works, not in
anything that you have read in original works. So first,
there is a presumption against such a tort you must admit.
Then you think, well, might that be, because it is
not likely that this situation has never arisen before. And
then you think, well, perhaps it contradicts basic principles
and there is the principle that springs to mind that does
stand in the way of this recognition of these torts that’s
been often mentioned. It is represented by Article 89 of the
Mejelle and article 1510. So this must be some part of the
explanation as to why [these] torts are not recognized
explicitly and that is, as it reads, article 89, “The judgment
for an act is made to fall on the person who does it. And it
does not fall on the person who gives the order, as long as
he does not compel the doing of the act.” This is one in the
Mejelle and it appears in several others here, such as article
1510: the order of a person is lawful in respect to his own
property only. Therefore , if someone says to another,
“throw this property into the sea” and the person who
receives the order, throws it, knowing that the property
belongs to someone else, the owner can enforce
compensation for that property from the person who threw
it. Nothing is necessary for the person who gave the order,
so far as he has not used force.

The third witness presented by Unocal was Abdul Salam Azimi, a former law
professor at Kabul University Law School. Azimi testified that the Afghani courts are
currently operating and that in those courts injuries would only be compensable if direct.
Id.
48
Vogel is a Professor of Law at Harvard University School of Law specializing in
Islamic Law, and is director of the Harvard Islamic Studies Center. He has written
substantially on the subject of Islamic Commerce, including: ISLAMIC LAW & LEGAL
SYSTEMS: STUDIES OF SAUDI ARABIA (Boston 2000); ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE:
RELIGION, RISK AND RETURN (1998); and ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GULF: A
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS, COMPARISON AND PREDICTION (1997).

So the person who has ordered it offers no excuse
for the person who does it. The person who it is going to
be held liable. This law is religious law, and they feel that
the person who makes the fateful step to do the wrongful
thing had a point of decision, and he should have withheld
the act.
We may make a moral judgment somewhat
differently. But they have felt to accentuate the moral
responsibility of the individual, this ought to be the rule.49
In receiving this testimony (particularly the testimony by Vogel and Edge), the Court
decided that Afghanistan law was “readily and reliably ascertainable” and that the
Afghan courts would not enforce a tort for tortious interference with a contract. 50
2.

CPS International Inc. v. Dresser Industries Inc., 911 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1995).
In 1978, CPS International (a Delaware Corporation) and a Saudi Arabian

national named Abdullah Rushaid Al-Rushaid formed a Saudi Arabian Company named
Creole Al-Rushaid, Ltd., with the purpose of conducting business in Saudi Arabia. CPS
International was a wholly owned subsidiary of Creole Production Services, a Delaware
Corporation whose principle place of business is in Houston, Texas. Creole Al-Rushaid
was formed under Saudi Arabian law for the purpose of conducting operations in Saudi
Arabia. In 1983, CPS International and Al-Rushaid instituted an action in the Saudi
courts to dissolve the corporation.51 However, after the process proved cumbersome,
CPS International alleged that Al-Rushaid deliberately attempted to slow the process of
dissolving the corporation. CPS International further alleged that Al-Rushaid conspired
with Dresser Industries to drive CPS International out of the Saudi Arabian market.52

49

Bridas Corp., 16 S.W.3d at 905.
Id. at 906.
51
Id. at 21.
52
Id.
50

A number of different suits in federal and Saudi Arabian courts finally culminated
in a settlement between the parties.53 Nevertheless, CPS International and Creole brought
suit in Texas State Court against Al-Rushaid and Dresser Industries alleging the same
claims urged to the Saudi Arabian Courts. The District court granted summary judgment
against CPS and Creole finding that Saudi Arabian Law applied and did not recognize the
plaintiffs’ claims.
The appellate court reviewed the decision according to the standards accorded to
summary judgment decisions.54

The Court faced the mixed question of addressing a

foreign law as a mixture of fact and law.55 The Appellate Court’s decision treated the

53

In 1985, CPS brought a Federal Antitrust action against Dresser Industries and AlRushaid asserting that the defendants were engaged in a conspiracy to drive CPS out of
the Saudi Arabian market. The Court eventually dismissed the matter holding that there
was an insufficient impact on the U.S. Market to proceed as a Federal Antitrust matter.
CPS, 911 S.W.2d at 21. Before the court dismissed the matter, the CPS and Creole filed
a second action in the same court alleging similar facts, and claiming that the effects were
anti-competitive. The Court again dismissed CPS’s action stating: “if there are any
anticompetitive effects, surely they are in Saudi Arabia, where CARL (Creole AlRushaid Ltd.) was eliminated as a competitor. Id. Concurrently with the filing of its
original suit, CPS also filed a matter in Saudi Arabian Court against Al-Rushaid for
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, misappropriation of confidential
information, and conspiracy. The claims were heard by a three judge panel that held that
these matters were non-justicible under Saudi Arabian law, but, which went on to
investigate alternative means to resolve the parties’ disputes. Id. Both sides agreed to
settle the disputes with Al-Rushaid agreeing to cooperate in the Creole-Al- Rushaid
dissolution, and CPS agreeing to drop the aforementioned federal suits. CPS then
brought the action currently under discussion in the Texas State District Court.
54
The standard of review considers whether the movant successfully carried his burden
of proof at the trial level -- showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
judgment should be granted as a matter of law. See id. citing Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez,
819 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. 1991).
55
The court said that intuitively “the task of determining foreign law strikes us as a
factual inquiry into the content or text of foreign rules of law.” However, Texas Rules of
Evidence art. 203 makes clear that the determination of the content of foreign law is a
question of law for the court. CPS, 911 S.W.2d at 21. Thus, the Court rephrased its
assessment as one not to determine whether the trial court properly found no factual

application of Saudi Arabian law as a question of law, rather than a contestable issue of
fact. The Court accordingly considered the issues on two discreet planes: first, whether
the manner in which the Al-Rushaid defendants competed with Creole-Al- Rushaid could
have been determined by contract;

56

and second, whether Saudi Arabian law would

matter at issue, as whether the court reached a proper legal conclusion regarding its
content. Id.
56
Regarding the first issue, the court reviewed four different agreements executed
between Al-Rushaid and Creole in the context of their business relationship. Al-Rushaid
and Dresser relied upon three writings which allude both directly and indirectly to Saudi
Arabian law being applicable to any dispute.The first such agreement relied upon by AlRushaid and Dresser, what the Court describes as the Kriol Contract, included a provision
that states: “if arbitration fails to settle the dispute the case will be taken to the committee
of settling the Commercial disputes at Dammam; the contract continued stating that the
company shall abide by all the rules and regulations existing in force in the kingdom of
Saudi Arabia. All provisions not stated in this contract will be governed by the code of
the Companies Act.
The Second agreement appeared in the By-laws of Creole-Al- Rushaid. It
provided that “if any difference or dispute shall arise between the parties as to the
interpretation of the by-laws, or any other matter or thing arising therefrom or in
connection therewith, then, upon either parties giving notice of difference or dispute to
the other, the same shall be referred to arbitration the venue for which shall be the
Committee for Settlement of Commercial disputes, Dhaharan, Saudi Arabia.
The third contractual provision relied upon by the Al-Rushaid/ Dresser defendants
appeared in the working agreement between the parties. It stated that “Each director of
[Creole Al-Rushaid Ltd.] will meet the responsibilities imposed on him by the laws of
Saudi Arabia. Creole agrees to manage the joint venture company in accordance with
Saudi Arabian laws. … Any controversy or claim among the parties to this agreement
arising out of or relating to this agreement shall be settled in accordance with the
provision in the bylaws of [CARL] for the settlement of disputes. Id.
On the other hand, the CPS and Creole parties claimed that these expressions
cited by Al-Rushaid and Dresser were mere agreements to abide by Saudi Arabian law,
not binding choice of law clauses. CPS and Creole point to a fourth expression by the
parties in the Technical Assistance Agreement, which provides: “Any controversy,
dispute, or question arising out of, or in connection with, or in relation to this Agreeement
or its interpretation, performance, or nonperformance or any breach thereof shall be
determined in accordance with the Laws of the United States of America.
The court ultimately agreed with the CPS Creole parties that the choice of law
provision in the Technical Assistance Contract was the only genuine choice of law
provision. In doing so the court allowed the contract claims to proceed under U.S. law.

recognize a tort for interference with a contract. We will turn attention only to the second
as relevant to our discussion, as only the later addresses the application of Islamic law.
The Court’s assessment of which law governs the tort claims brought by CPS
and Creole centered around the Restatement (Second) on Conflicts of Laws. After
outlining the pertinent sections of the Restatement, the Court turned to its analysis. First,
the court found that the alleged injury occurred in Saudi Arabia: the Court noted that at
the bottom of Plaintiffs’ claims were the actions by Dresser to ‘“wrest field servicing
business in Saudi Arabia’ away from Creole-Al- Rushaid.

The Court pertinently

determined that the financial harm done to Creole-Al- Rushaid, though felt in Texas,
originated from actions occurring in Saudi Arabia. Next, the Court found that the injury
situs was in Saudi Arabia stating that though directed from Texas, the actions occurred in
Saudi Arabia.

Third, the Court noted that none of the nine litigants were Texas

Corporations with only two even holding offices in Texas; the court noted that the fact
that five of the nine litigants were Saudi Arabian, that this factor weighed against the
application of Texas law. A final review of the relationships of the parties also pointed to
the application of Saudi Arabian law.57
Thus, the court came to consider whether Saudi Arabia would allow for the tort of
interference with a contractual relationship. CPS International and Creole produced
William Van Orden Gnichtel,58 who testified that Saudi Arabia would recognize a claim
for tortious interference with a contract. He said: “I would set aside or disregard the
nomenclature and get to the essence, and the essence is basically that if one does a wrong
57

Id. at 29-30.
Apparently, Van Orden Gnichtel’s testimony regarding Saudi Arabian law was based
on conversations with a colleague, who unlike Gnichtel, is licensed as a Saudi Arabian
lawyer.
58

to another he will be required to compensate the wronged party.”59 The court found Van
Orden Gnichtel’s testimony to be fatal because it only considered a general principle
instead of the actual conduct in the case.60
Al-Rushaid and Dresser presented expert testimony from Joseph Saba, who
besides being more precise about Saudi Arabian Law, addressed the specifics of the
matter. He testified:
“The American concept of Tortious interference
with a contract is not among the acts giving rise to a cause
of action in Saudi Arabia. The nonexistence of such a
cause of action is consistent, inter alia, with the Hanbali
School’s emphasis on individual free will and
responsibility. If a person does not perform his contractual
obligations or does not enter into a contract or breaches his
duties to another, such conduct is his own responsibility,
not that of anyone else. Even if another person persuades,
requests or otherwise influences such conduct, that other
person is not liable in a civil action for monetary payments
to the plaintiff, in the absence of direct contractual
obligation running from that other person to the plaintiff.61
Saba continued by addressing a statement by Van Orden Gnichtel that the “Shari’a”
recognizes civil liability for wrongful acts resulting in damages… and is not dependant
on specific contractual arrangements or specific regulations promulgated by
government.”62 Saba said that though Van Orden Gnichtel’s interpretation is correct
when applied to Saudi Arabian law, it would be incorrect to apply this premise across the
gamit of American Tort claims. He said:
The Saudi scope of liability of one private party to another
does not encompass all acts which American law might
consider to be wrongful.... Finally, while the existence of
59

Id. at 31.
Id. at 31.
61
Id. at 32.
62
Id.
60

liability is not necessarily dependent upon "specific
contractual arrangements or specific regulations," the
conduct in question still must lie within an appropriate
category of actionable conduct under Saudi Arabia's strict
construction of the Shari'a. As stated above, based upon my
review of the pleadings in this case, the claims against
Dresser in this suit do not fit within such a category. There
is no nexus under Saudi law between Dresser and the
plaintiffs giving the plaintiffs the cause of action they
assert.63
On subsequent cross examination, CPS and Creole’s expert admitted that as applied,
Saudi Arabian law would not recognize a claim against a third party for tortious
interference with a contract.
The court subsequently addressed other issues of fiduciary duty, misappropriation
of trade secrets, and conspiracy. However, CPS and Creole failed to posit arguments to
the court specifically relating to these claims.

Accordingly, their tort claims were

dismissed.
3.

Saudi Basic Oil Industries Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical, 866 A.2d 1
(Del. 2005).
In 2004, the Delaware Supreme Court heard the matter of Saudi Basic Industries

Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co. Inc.64 In Saudi Basic, a Saudi Arabian partner
(Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (“SABIC”) in a joint venture with Mobil Yanbu
63

Id. at 32.
866 A.2d 1 (Del. 2005). This matter actually maintains two underlying cases as its
procedural history. In 2002, SABIC brought an action against ExxonMobil in the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey seeking a declaratory judgment that
ExxonMobil had used technology previously developed for the Joint ventures to obtain
proprietary information from SABIC. They further sought a judgment declaring that the
Exxon/SABIC venture owned the patents and seeking an injunction requiring
ExxonMobil to transfer them to the venture. During the discovery phase of the trial,
SABIC agreed to a consent order that would have required SABIC to respond to the
overcharge allegations. See Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 194 F.Supp.
2d 378, 384 (D.N.J. 2002). Instead of responding, SABIC filed the Delaware Superior
Court matter. 866 A.2d at 10 n.7.
64

Petrochemical Co. Inc. (“Mobil”) and Exxon Chemical Arabia, Inc. (“Exxon”) sought to
overturn a Superior Court order denying SABIC’s request for judgment that it did not
overcharge Mobil and Exxon for technologies licensed from a third party. Mobil and
Exxon countersued SABIC, and was awarded US$220,238,108 and US$196,642,656
respectively.65
In 1980, SABIC, a Saudi Arabian Corporation, created joint ventures with Mobil
and Exxon to manufacture polyethylene in Saudi Arabia. The Joint ventures carefully
negotiated their contract agreements, and as the Court says included a requirement that
the profits enjoyed by each joint venture partner would be limited to the profits earned by
the joint venture -- a provision the court deemed critical to its analysis.66 In particular,
the joint venture agreement provided: “To the extent either Partner, or any affiliate
thereof, procures patents, processes, and other licensing rights of third parties, and
sublicenses such rights to the partnership, it shall not receive any remuneration other than
actual cost incurred in acquiring and sublicensing such right.”67
In order to produce Polyethylene, Mobil and SABIC had to license technology it
did not own.68

In Spring 1980, SABIC informed Mobil that it would license the

technology directly from Union Carbide Corporation (“UCC”) and then sublicense the

65

Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
67
Id. at 8. The text of the Exxon venture differed slightly, reading: “Patents, Processes,
and other licensing rights of third parties which require the payment of royalties, rentals
and other remuneration to such third parties shall be paid by the partnership against
appropriate invoices. To the extent either partner or any Affiliate thereof procure such
rights and sublicenses for the Partnership, it shall not receive any remuneration other than
actual cost disbursed in acquiring such license.” Id.
68
Id. at 8.
66

technology to the joint venture;69 in making this overture, SABIC assured Mobil that it
would comply with the contractual requirements of passing on costs “dollar for dollar.”70
Nevertheless, over the following two decades SABIC marked up the costs before passing
them on to the joint venture for payment -- with Mobil and Exxon oblivious to the markup in costs.71
In June 1987, spurred by poor conditions in the polyethylene market, UCC agreed
to reduce its licensing royalties due, including the amount due from SABIC. At the same
time, Exxon and Mobil amended their joint ventures with SABIC to account for the
adjusted royalty fees. However, unbeknownst to Mobil or Exxon, SABIC had negotiated
for itself a royalty reduction rate that was significantly larger than the reductions in either
the Mobil or Exxon contracts.72
In 2000, ExxonMobil, now merged, discovered the overcharges.73 SABIC and
the Saudi Taxing Authority came into dispute about the royalties paid by SABIC to UCC
under the SABIC/UCC agreement; the Saudi Government determined that those
payments were taxable.

The decision prompted SABIC to send letters to the joint

ventures explaining the tax dispute and demanding their contribution to the tax. While

69

In 1980, UCC and SABIC executed a agreement granting SABIC an exclusive license
to the Unipol Technology within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Mobil and Exxon were
not permitted to attend the meeting between UCC and SABIC. Id.
70
Id.
71
The Court noted that SABIC’s motives appear related to insuring any losses the joint
venture may suffer, as they accounted for the increase in the profit margin of the
corporation. Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.

verifying the accuracy of the SABIC indemnification demand, ExxonMobil discovered
for the first time that SABIC had been overcharging the ventures.74
In the trial court, both sides agreed that Saudi Arabian substantive law applied to
the dispute. Specifically, the Court found that SABIC was liable for the Saudi tort of
ghasb or usurpation.75 SABIC argued that the conclusion that ghasb had been committed
was inappropriate because SABIC did not act forcefully and with the victim’s
knowledge. Concretely, SABIC’s argument was that because it had acted surreptiously
and without the victim’s knowledge, then Ghasb is simply inapplicable to the current
dispute. Indeed, SABIC stated that all ExxonMobil proved was that SABIC had engaged
in “secret conduct based on the color of right.”76 SABIC’s claims can be reduced to three
discreet questions by the Court: first that to commit ghasb under Saudi Arabian law,
ExxonMobil was required to establish, but failed to establish “an open and obvious taking
that is intentional and without any color of right;” second, that no Saudi Court would
have awarded enhanced damages in a contract case such as this one; and third that the
trial court, though purporting to employ the methodology that a Saudi Judge would
employ (Ijtihad) in fact only employed ijtihad as a post hoc rationalization for foreign
law rulings that were “arbitrary and unprincipled.”77

74

Id.
Other issues were presented for review, including whether the trial court’s evidentiary
rulings were accurate, whether the Delaware borrowing statute applied, and the
contractual construction of claims. This analysis only focuses on the Ghasb claims as
relevant to Islamic law. Id. at 11-30.
76
Id. at 29.
77
Id.
75

Addressing the question of ijtihad first, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the
Trial Court’s reasoning and method.78 The Court began by defining the religious aspects
of Saudi Arabian law, flowing from the Hanbali school. Dr. Vogel testified that Saudi
Judges “hew conservatively to the Hanbali school.”79

The Court also noted the

differences between Saudi Arabian law and that of Common Law countries, specifically,
that Islamic countries do not embrace precedent or stare decisis in the same way as
western courts do; and the relative unavailability of law reports to the public.80 From this
beginning the Supreme Court cited the trial judge’s rationale in applying Islamic law:
SABIC’s arguments ignore the simple truth that the
circumstances under which Ghasb damages are available
under Saudi law are not well known, much less defined,
because Saudi law is not based on precedent or stare
decisis. Contrary to the implication of SABIC’s briefing on
this issue, the reality is that one cannot simply consult a
statute book or a case reporter to find the elements of, or
damages available for the Saudi law tort of Ghasb. Nor can
one point to one definition of, or a given set of
circumstances giving rise to, Ghasb. To illustrate the
extreme difficulty of discerning and interpreting Saudi law,
the Court notes that none of the Saudi law experts who
testified agreed on the proper elements of Ghasb… Finally,
because Saudi law decisions are not published, even if the
decisions had precedential value (which all the experts
agree they do not) the Court could not look to decisions of
Saudi judges to determine the proper elements or define the
recoverable damages.81
The Supreme Court in affirming this reasoning by the Superior Court Judge, noted that
judges in Saudi Arabia must “first and last navigate within the boundaries” of the Hanbali
School’s authoritative works, including works by Mansur-al-Bahuti, a 17th century
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Id. at 30
Id. at 30 n. 72.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 31.
79

scholar, as well as the works of Ibn Qudama and Al Maqdisi.82 The Court, noting
testimony from Professor Hallaq that each time a Saudi law Judge exercises Ijtihad, “it is
basically his best … effort to find what is the right thing to do,”83 affirmed the trial
judge’s rationale as “doing the best it could to reach the right result.”
In coming to its conclusions, the trial judge heard evidence from four Saudi law
experts retained by the parties, as well as its own expert when conflict between the expert
opinions was apparent.

The Court particularly noted the contradiction between the

position submitted by SABIC expert Dr. Vogel that the Court could not credibly engage
in the ijtihad process. The court said in response:
According to Dr. Vogel, ijtihad requires for its credibility
qualification which on the very face of things, neither
Professor Hallaq, myself or, with respect, any U.S. Court
possesses. If Dr. Vogel is correct, then why did SABIC
choose to file this dispute in a United States Court. If Dr.
Vogel is correct that neither he, nor Dr. Hallaq possess the
qualifications to engage in the ijtihad process, then what
Saudi law “expert” would be able to assist this United
States court in determining the applicable Saudi law. 84
On this view, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s determinations under ijtihad.
Turning to the specific issue of Ghasb, the Court determined that “in order to
establish a claim for usurpation, ExxonMobil must show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that SABIC wrongfully exercised ownership or possessor rights over the
property of another without consent, “which means with blatant or reckless disregard for
those property rights.

82

The conduct need not be intentional.”

85

In coming to this

Id. at 31.
Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 2003 WL 22016843, at *2 n. 8.
84
Id. The Court also noted the contradiction of SABIC posing this argument only after
receiving a unfavorable judgment.
85
Id. at 33.
83

definition, the trial court rejected SABIC’s argument that Ghasb must include elements
of being open and notorious as well as intentional without color of right. The court relied
upon experts that said the Hanbali’s school requires no such elements for the tort. For
example Dr. Wolfson testified that there is “no single binding definition of Ghasb, but
rather a range of possibilities.86 The Court specifically rejected Dr. Vogel’s definition of
Ghasb, who suggested that openness and intentional conduct were required.

87

Instead,

the court embraced the testimony of Dr. Wolfson, who testified that the most revered
Hanbali scholars do not include openness or intention in their definition of Ghasb.88 In
turn, Hallaq testified that the victim does not need to know he was a victim to be
considered a victim of Ghasb. On this basis, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed
the lower court ruling.
Regarding the practice (or non-practice) of awarding enhanced damages by Saudi
Courts, the trial judge said:
[S]imply because SABIC's expert is unable to name a case
in which a Saudi judge awarded damages for usurpation is
of little import to this Court considering that Saudi law
does not recognize stare decisis and Saudi law opinions are
not published. To say that usurpation damages are "highly
unusual" presumes that there are Saudi law cases where
judges refuse to award damages for usurpation even when
the elements have been clearly established. No such case
law was provided to the Court, nor could it be, given the
nuances of the Saudi law system. Moreover, whether a
86

Id. at 33.
Id. The Court does not find Dr. Vogel's latest definition of ghasb persuasive. Having
had the opportunity to watch Dr. Vogel testify, observe his demeanor on the witness
stand when his interpretation of Saudi law was challenged, and review his latest affidavit
as well as his prior affidavits and deposition testimony, the Court finds he has become (or
been exposed as) more of an advocate than an objective scholar of Islamic law. His
relentless attacks on Dr. Hallaq's qualifications and expertise further undermine his
credibility in the Court's eye. The Court is concerned about Dr. Vogel's objectivity.
88
Id. at 33-34.
87

form of damages is "unprecedented" is also irrelevant if
such damages are available according to the authoritative
Hanbali texts which are the primary works consulted by
Saudi judges to determine the law applicable to the type of
dispute raised in this case.89

The Court also noted that Dr. Wolfson testified that in tort actions in the Hanbali school,
damages, such as those awarded in this case, are not so irregular as to be incorrect.90
4. Blackstone v. Aramco Services Co., No. 80-44642, 1991 WL 63630 (Tex. Ct. App.
4/25/1991).
In 1964 Arabian American Oil Co. (“ARAMCO”) hired Robert E. Blackstone to
work in Saudi Arabia as a waterwell maintenance manager.

In 1979, ARAMCO

conducted an internal investigation to determine the validity of allegations that five senior
managers, including Blackstone, received favors from contractors or had improperly
approved invoices for subcontractors.91 Blackstone claimed that ARAMCO investigators
were threatening him, and he returned to Texas. Blackstone was allegedly forced to take
early retirement, and suffered from severe mental and emotional injuries.92
Blackstone in 1980 filed suit against ARAMCO alleging improper termination,
slander, negligence, false imprisonment, assault, and infliction of emotional distress.
Among the remedies sought by Blackstone included that of taz’ir - a lashing of the
tortfeasor by the state. After deciding whether Saudi law applied, the Court turned to
whether Saudi law recognized the torts Blackstone alleged.
The Court initially noted that:

89

Id. at 35.
Id.
91
Blackstone, 1991 WL 63630, at *1.
92
Id. at *2.
90

the Shari’a does not permit actions for damages of a moral
or emotional nature. Serious bodily injury, short of death
gives the victim the right to recover money damages
determined according to the importance of the injured
organ or the seriousness of the wound inflicted. Anything
short of physical injury or damage to a specific part of the
body that is inflicted by some form of physical contact does
not give rise to compensable claims for damages under
Shari’a, but may subject the tortfeasor to the criminal
sanction of Ta’zir.93
Finding that Blackstone exhibited no physical injuries, the court denied his contention
that Saudi Law would afford a remedy for his claims.94 Finally the court noted that
Blackstone’s claim for imprisonment or lashings are outside the jurisdictional scope of
the Courts. The Court noted that Taz’ir is a penal claim and therefore outside the
boundaries of the district civil court.95
5. Rhodes v. ITT Sheraton Corp, No. Civ. A. 97-4530-B, 1999 WL 26874; 9 Mass. L.
Rptr. 355 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1/15/1999).
In 1994, Emma Louise Rhodes was injured while a guest at the Sheraton Jeddah
Hotel and Villas (“Jeddah”) in Saudi Arabia.96

Rhodes was a British national; the

defendants, all Massachusetts citizens, were ITT Sheraton Corp (“ITT”), Sheraton
International Inc., (“International”), Sheraton Overseas Management Corporation
(“Overseas”), Sheraton Middle East Management Corp. (“Middle East”), and John
Veelenturf, Vice President of ITT and director of fire, life safety and environment.
Rhodes did not name as defendants Jeddah nor its Saudi Arabian owner Saudi Brothers
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Id. at *3.
Blackstone claimed that his injuries included “depression, anxiety, tension, insomnia,
anorexia, nervous eating, and seclusiveness.” Id.
95
Id. at *5.
96
Rhodes, 1999 WL 26874, at *1.
94

Commercial Company (“Saudi Brothers”).97 Under a contractual arrangement between
Saudi Brothers and Middle East Management Corp. (“Middle East”) Middle East
operates the Sheraton Jeddah for Saudi Brothers.98

Middle East is a wholly owned

subsidiary of ITT.99 ITT also owns International, which granted Saudi Brothers a license
to use Sheraton trademarks.100 ITT also owns Overseas.101
Rhodes, while staying at Jeddah injured her spinal cord while diving into the
water.102 The resort complex encompassed a beach, a large concrete wharf, a wooden
platform or jetty and a lagoon.103 Coral reef stretched underneath the jetty and around the
edge of the lagoon.104 Rhodes struck her head on the Coral when she dove into the
lagoon from the Jetty.105 She lay in the water, face down and unable to move until she
was pulled out and taken to a nearby hospital.106 Rhodes suffered a high level spinal
injury and spent three months in a Saudi Hospital where she underwent surgery to fuse
her spine.107 As a result of her injuries, Rhodes is a tetraplegic, unable to move her left
arm, either of her legs, and has limited function of the right arm.108
The Massachusetts Superior Court reviewed whether an adequate alternative forum
existed for Ms. Rhodes claims and whether the matter should be transferred. On the first
issue, the court considered whether the Saudi Arabian Courts were adequate alternative
97

Id. at *1 & 1 n. 2.
Id.
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Id.
100
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at *1.
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Id.
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Id
105
Id.
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Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
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forums.

The court noted that the plaintiff would encounter significant “procedural

disadvantages” if the matter was to proceed in Saudi Arabian courts.109 On the testimony
of Frank Vogel,110 the court noted that the Plaintiff would not be entitled to testify
herself.111 Vogel testified that “all parties are presumed to be prejudiced in favor of
themselves and therefore are not considered to be reliable witnesses.”112 Vogel noted
that the plaintiff would be entitled to submit written assertions;113 but on the commentary
of Peter Sloane, the court concluded that this testimony is somewhat disfavored to oral
testimony.114 The court also noted the lack of pre-trial discovery procedures, the lack of
non-uniform rules of procedure in Saudi Courts, no jurisprudential precedent, and the
biases against women as substantial procedural hurdles presented to the plaintiff.115
Then, the Court noted that the public policy factors recommended trying the case in
Massachusetts. Among the rationale used was that Massachusetts law seemed to be more
“equitable” to the claims of the plaintiff. The Court said:
For example, the better rule of law in a tort case probably
would be that of Massachusetts. Saudi tort law is
"subsumed under private actions and do[es] not exist as a
distinct and highly developed field of law." Brand, supra at
28. Given the theory of liability in this case, it also is
significant that Saudi law does not recognize agency within
the concept of torts. Id. (general Islamic philosophy is that
one is always responsible for one's own acts). Moreover,
consequential, indirect, and speculative damages generally
are viewed as nonrecoverable through a Saudi court. Turck,
supra at 441. If she establishes defendants' liability,
109

Id. at *2.
See supra note ___.
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Rhodes, 1999 WL 26874 at *2.
112
Id. at *2.
113
Id. at *2.
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Id. citing Peter B. Sloane, The Status of Islamic Law in the Modern Commercial
World, 22 INT’L L. 743, 751 (1988).
115
Id.
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plaintiff could only expect to recover actual medical
expenses and a fraction of her "diyah," which is a fixed
amount of compensation for personal injury.116
On the basis of this discussion, the trial court ruled that the Saudi forum was not
appropriate for plaintiff’s claims.117
6. Chadwick v. Arabian American Oil Co., 656 F.Supp. 857 (D. Del. 1987).
In 1987, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware heard claims by Reed
Chadwick, an employee of an independent contractor hired to do work in Saudi
Arabia.118 Chadwick claimed that while working in Saudi Arabia, he sought medical
attention from a doctor retained by the Arabian American Oil Co. (“Arabia Oil”), the
employer of Chadwick’s independent contractor.119 The doctor originally diagnosed
Chadwick’s problem as gas, and provided him with Antacid treatments.120 A year later,
Chadwick, still complaining of the same stomach pains, had an upper GI done by a
different doctor retained by Arabia Oil who diagnosed the problem as a duodenal ulcer.121
Later, after returning to the United States, Chadwick was diagnosed by a U.S. doctor has
having a malignant stomach tumor.122 As a result, his entire stomach, spleen, and a
portion of his liver and pancreas were removed; he was unable to return to work.123
After deciding that Saudi Arabian law should apply to this dispute, the Court held
that Chadwick could not state a claim for relief against Arabian Oil. The Court held that
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Id. at *5.
Id.
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Chadwick, 956 F. Supp. At 809.
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Id.
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Id. at 859.
121
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Saudi law does not recognize vicarious liability.124 The Court stated that under Saudi
Arabian law, “vicarious liability is not recognized unless it is proven that an actor’s free
will is obliterated by the person directing the actor to act.”125 The Court continued, “The
Shari’a, the common law of Saudi Arabia, ‘has a strict rule that responsibility for human
action is individual and not vicarious.’”126 Thus the court held that Chadwick, to the
extent that he had a claim, had to proceed against the Saudi doctors, not Arabian Oil.
7. National Group for Communications and Computers v. Lucent Technologies
International, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 290 (D.N.J. 2004).
In 2004, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey heard claims for
breach of contract by the National Group for Communications and Computers Ltd.
(“NGCC”) against Lucent Technologies Inc. (“Lucent”).127 The magistrate ordered the
parties to submit evidence relating to Saudi Arabian law, as both parties agreed that
Saudi Arabian law governed the dispute. NGCC sued Lucent for breach of contract
relating to the installation of pay phone and emergency phone stations along highways in
Saudi Arabia.

The total amount of the contract was $75,460,902.

NGCC sought

damages in excess of $92,319,579, which included claims for future loss and unearned
profits.128
The Court began its analysis of Saudi law by noting the differences between it and
U.S. law.

The Court came to the conclusion that the religious practices of Islam

permeates every aspect of life in Saudi Arabia, most pertinently Contract disputes. The
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Court, relying on Frank Vogel,129 noted that the Saudi Arabia legal system is governed
exclusively by Shari’a.130 The Court then said “ in fact, there are not “laws” in Saudi
Arabia other than Islamic law, and any supplemental rules promulgated by the Saudi
government are actually considered regulations known as “Nizam.”131 The Court noted
that these regulations are valid only to the extent that they are consistent with Shari’a.
The Court then went on to define the sources of Shari’a:
The Shari'a is the product of several interrelated
sources of religious authority. (Frank E. Vogel Tr. 143: 2122; William M. Ballntyne Tr. 228:18- 19; Mujahid M. AlSawwaf Tr. 418: 17-21). The doctrines comprising Shari'a
are derived primarily from the Qur'an, the "Book of God."
The Qur'an is considered the word of God as received by
the Prophet Muhammed. Because the Qur'an commands
adherents of Islam to obey the Prophet, the recorded
examples of the acts and words of Muhammed, known as
the "Sunnah," constitute an additional integral part of the
Shari'a. (Vogel Tr. 143-44: 20-1). In the centuries since the
founding of Islam, Islamic religious-legal scholars qualified
to interpret the scriptural sources have produced opinions
known as "fiqh." A complete understanding of the Shari'a
in Saudi Arabia today also requires reference to any
relevant fiqh for guidance. There are four schools of Shari'a
law, each of which interprets Islamic doctrine somewhat
differently. The predominant school followed in the courts
of Saudi Arabia is known as the "Hanbali" school.132
When a Saudi Arabian judge, known as a "qadi," attempts
to resolve disputes, his decision must be in accordance with
the Shari'a. Therefore, he will turn to the aforementioned
Qur'an, the Sunnah, and fiqh to guide his legal
determination. Saudi Arabian judges are not bound by
judicial precedent (in fact, Saudi Arabian judicial opinions
are not published) and the concept of stare decisis does not
exist. (Vogel Tr. 143:2-4; Ballantyne Tr. 260-61:25- 1).
129
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Instead, judges "must strive for the divine truth for each
case that confronts him, without being bound by past
opinions, even his own. Truth is the ultimate precedent, to
which one must return once it is revealed."133
Generally speaking, the Saudi Arabian legal structure is
highly traditional and judges strictly apply classical Islamic
law. In contrast to other Islamic countries that have adapted
religious tenets to meet modern demands, in Saudi Arabia,
Shari'a remains free of compromising reforms. (Vogel Tr.
166:14-25). The Board of Grievances too is very
conservative in its interpretation of commercial and
contract law. (Vogel Tr. 163:10-11). As one author noted,
"commercial jurisprudence in Saudi Arabia remains
marked by a conservative fiqh orientation, reflecting the
shari'a educations of the judges.... [W]henever the
expectations of international commerce conflict with fixed
standards of the old Hanbali law, it is the former that gives
way."134
A key doctrine within the Shari'a is the prohibition on
"gharar," meaning risk or uncertainty. Gharar is absolutely
repugnant to Islamic law. (Vogel Tr. 154-55:16-9). Future
activity is deemed gharar because it is uncertain to anyone
except for God. One of the consequences of this categorical
rejection of gharar is that Saudi Arabian courts will not
enforce the sale of anything uncertain or unknown. The
object of a contract must be certain and defined and in
existence. Several historical accounts of the acts and
statements of the Prophet Muhammed, known as "hadith,"
are instructive on this issue:
Do not buy fish in the sea, for it is gharar. The Prophet
forbade sale of what is in the wombs, sale of the contents of
the udders, sale of a slave when he is runaway ... The
Messenger of God forbade the [sale of] the copulation of
the stallion. He who purchases food shall not sell it until he
weighs it.135
One scholar expounded upon the implications that the
prohibition of gharar has in producing differing
133
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understandings of contractual obligations under Western
and Islamic law: In English law the sanctity of contract
means that the promise endures despite the normal
vicissitudes of fortune. It is right that the promise should be
kept 'for better or for worse', 'through thick and thin',
because this in line with the popular belief that tenacity of
purpose to some degree controls events and that the human
will determines the future. The promise must dominate the
circumstances. For Islam precisely the converse is true.
Circumstances dominate the promise. Future circumstances
are neither predictable nor controllable but lie entirely in
the hands of the Almighty.... If the tide of affairs turns then
the promise naturally floats out with it.136
After this extensive discussion of Islamic law, the court then proceeded to the questions
underlying this dispute.

The Court noted that under Saudi Arabian law, damages

available for breach of contract are generally limited to those losses which are actual and
direct.137 Further, “Saudi law will not allow damages which are ascertainable only means
involving speculation, contingencies, uncertainties or indeterminacy.”138 Thus, under the
prohibition against Gharar, the Court will not allow expectation damages to be heard.139
Additionally, under the same prohibition, Saudi law would not allow damages for lost
profits, unrealized gains or future profits.
Plaintiff, whose expert was Frank Vogel, presented evidence that “higher
valuations of damages are possible as long as the future event is not an explicit condition
of the contract, and that uncertainty that is subsumed within a larger entity, such as a
corporation, would be upheld , and that it is only when gharar inheres within a separate
entity is it forbidden.”140 The court simply rejected this line of argument. Accordingly,
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the Court limited the potential claims of the plaintiff to those damages actually suffered
by NGCC, exclusive of any future or uncertain amounts.141
PART TWO
CATEGORIZING JUDICIAL APPROACHES
As described above, American Courts reach questions of Islamic substance
through three cognative stages: (1) recognition; (2) assimilation; and (3) response.
Courts first attempt to recognize the issues that are involved, the law applicable and the
appropriate basis to determine the issues. Next, the courts begin to assimilate the matters
to determine what response they should make. Finally, they formulate their response,
either in terms of their own jurisprudence or in terms of a compromised understanding.
This part categorizes the seven courts described in part one as responding to the
propositions presented by Islamic law with either procedural distance (formalism),
interpretive bias, or transliteration.
a.

Formalistic Responses to Islam

Formalism is a posture of the court to divorce itself from the facts and deal strictly
with the law.142 Thus, the court, coldly and without regard to emerging patterns simply
applies the law. The formalistic court does not see itself making policy; rather, its
foremost goal is to “apply” the law to the cold set of facts before it.
Bridas Corp. v. Unocal Corp. provides a nice illustration. 143 The Bridas
litigation resulted from contracts between Bridas Corp. and the governments of
Afghanistan and Turkmenistan, and Bridas’s allegations that Unocal Corp. tortiously
141
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interfered with those agreements.144 The Texas Appellate court reviewed the question
whether the tort interference with a contractual relationship would be allowed under
Afghani law. 145 Recall the Court’s citation of Frank Vogel’s testimony, which it found
most persuasive:
One thinks, when one encounters anything like this, these
torts specifically, if you encounter something in the
translation that corresponds with these torts, you come up
with absolutely nothing, not in any secondary works, not in
anything that you have read in original works. So first,
there is a presumption against such a tort you must admit.
Then you think, well, might that be, because it is not likely
that this situation has never arisen before. And then you
think, well, perhaps it contradicts basic principles and there
is the principle that springs to mind that does stand in the
way of this recognition of these torts that’s been often
mentioned. It is represented by Article 89 of the Mejelle
and article 1510. So this must be some part of the
explanation as to why [these] torts are not recognized
explicitly and that is, as it reads, article 89, “The judgment
for an act is made to fall on the person who does it. And it
does not fall on the person who gives the order, as long as
he does not compel the doing of the act.”146
In receiving this testimony, the Court decided that Afghanistan law was “readily and
reliably ascertainable” and that the Afghan courts would not enforce a tort for tortious
interference with a contract.

147

The Court’s approach was to use law and law alone to

come to this result -- a benchmark of formalism.

Succinctly, the Court’s analysis

proceeded: (1) Afghani law is readily ascertainable to conclude this result; (2) there is no
tort concept of interference with a contract within Afghani law; and (3) principles derived
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from Afghani law would suggest that there is no similar cause of action. The process is
of survey, elimination, and distinction, without much regard to assimilating concepts or
even understanding differences. Notably, the Court only considered Islamic law to the
extent necessary to determine whether the issue was justicible in its own forum.
b.

Interpretive Approach

A second approach by the courts surveyed is an interpretive approach. This
approach is characterized by the opinion in Rhodes v. ITT Sheraton Corp. 148 Recall the
threshold question as framed by the Massachusetts Superior Court -- whether an adequate
alternative forum existed for Ms. Rhodes claims and whether the matter should be
transferred. On the first issue, the court considered whether the Saudi Arabian Courts
were adequate alternative forums. The court noted that the plaintiff would encounter
significant “procedural disadvantages” if the matter was to proceed in Saudi Arabian
courts.149 On the testimony of Frank Vogel,150 the court noted that the Plaintiff would not
be entitled to testify herself.151 Vogel testified that “all parties are presumed to be
prejudiced in favor of themselves and therefore are not considered to be reliable
witnesses.”152

Vogel noted that the plaintiff would be entitled to submit written

assertions;153 but on the commentary of Peter Sloane, the court concluded that this
testimony is somewhat disfavored to oral testimony.154 From this, the court perceived a
lack of pre-trial discovery procedures, the lack of non-uniform rules of procedure in
148
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Saudi Courts, no jurisprudential precedent, and the biases against women as substantial
procedural hurdles presented to the plaintiff.155
Then, the Court noted that the public policy factors recommended trying the case in
Massachusetts. Among the rationale used was that Massachusetts law seemed to be more
“equitable” to the claims of the plaintiff. The Court said:
For example, the better rule of law in a tort case probably
would be that of Massachusetts. Saudi tort law is
"subsumed under private actions and do[es] not exist as a
distinct and highly developed field of law." Brand, supra at
28. Given the theory of liability in this case, it also is
significant that Saudi law does not recognize agency within
the concept of torts. Id. (general Islamic philosophy is that
one is always responsible for one's own acts). Moreover,
consequential, indirect, and speculative damages generally
are viewed as nonrecoverable through a Saudi court. Turck,
supra at 441. If she establishes defendants' liability,
plaintiff could only expect to recover actual medical
expenses and a fraction of her "diyah," which is a fixed
amount of compensation for personal injury.156
On the basis of this discussion, the trial court ruled that the Saudi forum was not
appropriate for plaintiff’s claims.157
The Court’s analysis is directly in contradistinction to the formalistic approach of
Bridas. Rhodes addresses the law first and foremost in relation to the plaintiff’s injuries.
That Saudi Law makes the most sense given the approximation of the Plaintiff’s injuries
is not the primary cause for the Court’s consideration. Rather, the Court in reviewing the
law of Saudi Arabia made a character judgment that Saudi Arabian law was inadequate
for the court’s conception of justice. In this sense, Rhodes is a good example of courts
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that interpret Islamic law in terms of their own conceptions, rather than the unique
postulations on which the system of law was built.
c.

Transliterative Approach

A third approach used by courts surveyed is a transliterative approach; that is, one
takes concepts of Islamic law, finds parallels in American law, and then meets out the
distinctions. So, for example, when the Delaware Supreme Court heard the matter Saudi
Basic Oil Industries v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical, 158 the court attempted to understand
the Islamic principle of Ghasb in light of the word Usurpation.159 The Court’s approach
could have been problematic had it confused the vernacular “usurpation” and the term of
art “usurpation.”

160

Indeed, Islamic scholars suggest that Ghasb means an unjustified

taking -- the vernacular meaning of Usurpation, tied to specific property. An action for
Ghasb would pit the property claimant against the property holder. If the person who
allegedly dispossessed the plaintiff of his property proved that he had a better right to the
property, then the claim for Ghasb failed.

158

866 A.2d 1 (Del. 2005). In Saudi Basic, SABIC, a Saudi Arabian Corporation, created
joint ventures with Mobil and Exxon to manufacture polyethylene in Saudi Arabia. The
Joint Ventures specifically contracted to exclude the opportunity for the joint partners to
gain a profit at each other’s expense.
159
Other issues were presented for review, including whether the trial court’s evidentiary
rulings were accurate, whether the Delaware borrowing statute applied, and the
contractual construction of claims. This analysis only focuses on the Ghasb claims as
relevant to Islamic law. Id. at 11-30.
160
Guth v. Loft Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 509 (Del. 1939). The artistic meaning is more refined.
Usurpation, as used by U.S. Courts is a specific tort relating to fiduciaries that seize
unfairly upon an opportunity that either is to be shared between the fiduciary and his
principle or (in the case of a corporate officer) to be executed by the executive
exclusively.160 Specifically, a Corporate officer or director may not take an opportunity
for his own if: (1) the corporation is financially able to exploit the opportunity; (2) the
opportunity is within the corporation’s line of business; (3) the corporation has an interest
or expectancy in the project; and (4) by taking this opportunity for his own, the corporate
fiduciary will be placed in a position inimicable to his duties to the corporation.

The Court in weighing the expert testimony regarding Ghasb concluded that
“ExxonMobil [Plaintiff] must show by a preponderance of the evidence, that SABIC
wrongfully exercised ownership or possessory rights over the property of another without
consent, “which means with blatant or reckless disregard for those property rights. The
Conduct need not be intentional.” The Court effectively used a vernacular concept
(Usurpation) and then was able to narrow its wide definition, resist the temptation to
mold the term towards its American meaning, and thereby render a just result.161
Importantly, the Court in SABIC saw itself performing the function of a Saudi
Arabian judge. Addressing the question of ijtihad first, the Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed the Trial Court’s reasoning and method.162

The Court began by defining the

religious aspects of Saudi Arabian law, flowing from the Hanbali school. Dr. Vogel
testified that Saudi Judges “hew conservatively to the Hanbali school.”163 The Court also
noted the differences between Saudi Arabian law and that of Common Law countries,
specifically, that Islamic countries do not embrace precedent or stare decisis in the same
way as western courts do; and the relative unavailability of law reports to the public.164
From this beginning the Supreme Court cited the trial judge’s rationale in applying
Islamic law:
SABIC’s arguments ignore the simple truth that the
circumstances under which Ghasb damages are available
under Saudi law are not well known, much less defined,
because Saudi law is not based on precedent or stare
161
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decisis. Contrary to the implication of SABIC’s briefing on
this issue, the reality is that one cannot simply consult a
statute book or a case reporter to find the elements of, or
damages available for the Saudi law tort of Ghasb. Nor can
one point to one definition of, or a given set of
circumstances giving rise to, Ghasb. To illustrate the
extreme difficulty of discerning and interpreting Saudi law,
the Court notes that none of the Saudi law experts who
testified agreed on the proper elements of Ghasb… Finally,
because Saudi law decisions are not published, even if the
decisions had precedential value (which all the experts
agree they do not) the Court could not look to decisions of
Saudi judges to determine the proper elements or define the
recoverable damages.165
The Supreme Court in affirming this reasoning by the Superior Court Judge, noted that
judges in Saudi Arabia must “first and last navigate within the boundaries” of the Hanbali
School’s authoritative works, including works by Mansur-al-Bahuti, a 17th century
scholar, as well as the works of Ibn Qudama and Al Maqdisi.166 The Court, noting
testimony from Professor Hallaq that each time a Saudi law Judge exercises Ijtihad, “it is
basically his best … effort to find what is the right thing to do,”167 affirmed the trial
judge’s rationale as “doing the best it could to reach the right result.”
A second example of a court using a transliterative approach to Islamic law is in
NGCC v. Lucent Technologies International, Inc.168

NGCC revolved around a

contractual dispute relating to the installation of certain payphone and emergency phone
stations in Saudia Arabia. NGCC sued Lucent Technologies for failure to perform, and
sought damages not only for the amounts injured, but for lost profits, future loss, and lost
opportunity. The central Islamic concept considered was that of Gharar.
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The Court’s analysis proceeded by explaining the context of Islamic law,169 the
role of Islamic law judges within the legal system,170 and then the relation of the current
dispute to the English vernacular. The Court addressingGharar said:
A key doctrine within the Shari'a is the prohibition on
"gharar," meaning risk or uncertainty. Gharar is absolutely
repugnant to Islamic law. (Vogel Tr. 154-55:16-9). Future
activity is deemed gharar because it is uncertain to anyone
except for God. One of the consequences of this categorical
rejection of gharar is that Saudi Arabian courts will not
enforce the sale of anything uncertain or unknown. The
object of a contract must be certain and defined and in
existence. 171
One scholar expounded upon the implications that the
prohibition of gharar has in producing differing
understandings of contractual obligations under Western
and Islamic law: In English law the sanctity of contract
means that the promise endures despite the normal
vicissitudes of fortune. It is right that the promise should be
kept 'for better or for worse', 'through thick and thin',
169
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because this in line with the popular belief that tenacity of
purpose to some degree controls events and that the human
will determines the future. The promise must dominate the
circumstances. For Islam precisely the converse is true.
Circumstances dominate the promise. Future circumstances
are neither predictable nor controllable but lie entirely in
the hands of the Almighty.... If the tide of affairs turns then
the promise naturally floats out with it.172
Turning then to the facts of the case, the court noted that under Islamic law, damages
available for breach of contract are generally limited to those loses which are actual and
direct. 173 The Court further noted that “Saudi law will not allow damages which are
ascertainable only by means involving speculation, contingencies, uncertainties or
indeterminacy.”174 Thus, under the prohibition against Gharar, the Court will not allow
expectation damages to be heard.175 Additionally, under the same prohibition, Saudi law
would not allow damages for lost profits, unrealized gains or future profits. The court’s
assessment in NGCC is transliterative, as it approached a western concept -- expectation
damages -- classified under an Islamic term, and then ruled according to the Islamic
principles. Like SABIC, the Court in NGCC saw itself assuming the same role as an
Islamic jurist, a point discussed in section three below.
PART THREE
Navigating Differences
The ways that courts approach the initial conflict of western and Islamic law
determines to a great extent how they navigate the differences between the two. As a
general proposition, the courts that engage in formalistic approaches never navigate the
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differences as their function is a mere rote application of principles without much
reflection towards the issues. Similarly, the interpretive approach exemplified by Rhodes
tends to superficially highlight differences towards the specific agenda set forth by the
court. The transliterative approach tends to seek understanding of the differences and
makes a conscious effort to navigate those differences to reach judicious results.
The formalistic approach does not appear interested in the differences between
Islamic law and Western law. For example the primary corpus of the formalistic
opinions is a conflicts of laws analysis that seems to govern the outcome of the cases
more so than any applicable law.176 So, when the Court in Bridas decides that Afghani
law will apply over Texas law, the application of Afghani law is secondary to the primary
decision that determines the party’s liability. Said another way, the conflicts of laws
analysis enables formalistic application of law to the disputes, allowing courts to insulate
themselves against the need to critically consider whether differences exist, whether those
differences are just, and whether the court’s interpretation of those differences is correct.
Similarly, when the Court engages in an interpretive methodology, the Court
highlights the differences towards the result it wants to achieve. Thus, in Rhodes, the
court’s assessment that “Saudi law” would not protect the plaintiff’s interests in the same
way as “Massachusetts law” may be correct on the surface level.177 Yet without any sort
of meaningful exchange of concepts, the Court’s opinion seems less than unbiased. The
Court chose not to move beyond the surface, but was content to mind its useful premise
and build the opinion around differences that it sees as inconsistent with notions of
justice. So for Rhodes, the unavailability of speculative, indirect, or consequential
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damages, an agency theory of tort, or certain trial procedures recommended the Court’s
assumption of the matter regardless of the minimal contacts the plaintiff maintained with
the court; indeed, the court does not even address this fact, but rather places the impetus
of its decision on the unjust results that could result should Islamic law apply.
Finally, unlike the formalistic or interpretive approaches, the transliterative
approach confronts the differences inherent in the legal systems, finds the principles
applicable to the matter, and applies those principles to the case facts. Thus in SABIC,
the court is able to distinguish between western conceptions of Ghasb to reach a just
solution to the dispute. Similarly, the NGCC court navigates the western concepts of
damages and aligns that concept with the principles of Islamic law that would mitigate
against their application. In both scenarios the court confronts the differences in the legal
systems before moving towards application.
PART FOUR
Judicial Self-Limitation.
A final aspect of this translation process is one of self-limitation. Again the ways
the courts address the cases dictate the extent that they limit their function. Neither the
formalistic courts nor the interpretive courts embrace self-limitation; rather the two
methodologies on opposite ends of the spectrum tend to insulate themselves against
Islamic law, but in different ways. For the formalistic court the law (or procedure) itself
provides an insulation away from the differences in the legal system. For the interpretive
court, the perception that policy is more important that judicial procedure serves as an
equal disservice -- it limits the court’s analysis to matters that don’t offend its policy

consideration. Only the courts that embrace a transliterative perspective truly become
self-limiting in their function and thereby translate Islamic law appropriately.
Analyzing the transliterative courts (SABIC and NGCC) two characteristics are
apparent. First, both courts appear to take the initiative of their own to understand the
Islamic principles being described. The SABIC judge retained a separate expert from the
parties in an attempt to understand the contours of Islamic law. The court of appeals
commented on the SABIC judge’s approach:
Mindful of how daunting would be the task of determining
the Saudi law principles applicable to this case, the trial
judge made exceptional efforts to ensure that she was fully
informed of the Hanbali teachings upon which to ground
her legal rulings….After reviewing a total of over one
thousand pages of deposition testimony, the trial judge then
held a day long pre-trial hearing, to permit the parties to
present live testimony [from their experts].
Similarly, the NGCC judge accepted not only the testimony presented by expert
witnesses of the parties, but went outside their testimony to conduct research and cited
that research in its opinion. These Courts clearly saw themselves as doing more than
arbitrating the parties’ disputes; rather they perceived their function as navigating the
differences between Islamic and Western legal systems to arrive at a close approximation
of justice.
A second characteristic of both transliterative opinions is the threshold desire to
understand their roles not from the traditional standpoint of western jurisprudence, but a
willingness to embrace an Islamic approach to the law. Notably the court in SABIC even
addressed the methodology of using Ijtihad in coming to the best result: “when faced
with the daunting task of determining the elements of Ghasb and the damages available
for this tort, the Court weighing the credibility of each Saudi law expert, exercised, as

best it could under the circumstances ijtihad, to reach the “right result.” Similarly, the
court in NGCC began its analysis by describing the function of a Saudi law judge:
When a Saudi Arabian judge, known as a "qadi," attempts
to resolve disputes, his decision must be in accordance with
the Shari'a. Therefore, he will turn to the aforementioned
Qur'an, the Sunnah, and fiqh to guide his legal
determination. Saudi Arabian judges are not bound by
judicial precedent (in fact, Saudi Arabian judicial opinions
are not published) and the concept of stare decisis does not
exist. (Vogel Tr. 143:2-4; Ballantyne Tr. 260-61:25- 1).
Instead, judges "must strive for the divine truth for each
case that confronts him, without being bound by past
opinions, even his own. Truth is the ultimate precedent, to
which one must return once it is revealed."178
The approach is more than just semantics.

It represents conscience efforts by the

judiciary to embrace a different kind of role than it typically assumes -- a role as an
Islamic jurist, rather than as a law judge.
EPILOGUE
Approaching Islamic law is a daunting task, particularly for judges not trained in
its philosophical underpinnings.

When western judges engage in applying Islamic

principles in cases, there is a natural translation process. The judge reacts to not only the
Islamic principles he is engaging but his own environment as well. In doing so, he
reveals differences that are only revealed when the two sets of law collide. As Judge, the
way he approaches the case, whether he self-limits or self-aggrandizes, determines
whether differences in Islamic law will be fruitfully understood or irrationally meted out.
In Rhodes, the court did not attempt to understand the Islamic principles, and was content
to brush over them, so as to render them meaningless to the court’s decision. Similarly,
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formalistic opinions allow the court to safeguard itself by not delving into the differences,
and rather remaining on the surface.
Only the transliterative approach offers constructive methods for understanding
Islamic law in the face of Western commerce.

In transliterating the law, the court

redefines itself away from a role its most comfortable with towards areas of judicial
uncertainty. It is in that uncertainty that the Judge is able to confront the differences on
an open plane, and truly seek just results.

